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ABSTRACT: One approach to science treats science as a cognitive 
accomplishment of individuals and so defines a scientific community 
as an aggregate of individual enquirers. Another treats science as a 
fundamentally collective endeavor and so defines a scientist as a 
member of a scientific community. Distributed cognition has been 
offered as a framework that could be used to reconcile these two 
approaches. Adam Toon has recently asked if the cognitive and the 
social can be friends at last. He answers that they probably cannot, 
posing objections to the would-be rapprochement. We clarify both the 
animosity and the tonic proposed to resolve it, ultimately arguing that 
that worries raised by Toon and others are uncompelling. 
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 Treating science as a cognitive accomplishment of individuals, 
we might define a scientific community as an aggregate of individual 
enquirers. Contrariwise, treating science as a fundamentally collective 
endeavor, we might define a scientist as a member of a scientific 
community. The framework of distributed cognition has been heralded 
as a way of doing both at once (e.g., by Ronald Giere in a series of 
publications; 2002a, 2002b, 2003a, 2003b, 2003c, 2006, 2007, 2013; 
Giere&Moffatt, 2003). Adam Toon (2014) has recently posed 
objections to this would-be rapprochement between the cognitive and 
the social. Our aim is to clarify the issues and ultimately to show that 
distributed cognition can deliver on its promise of hooking up cognitive 
and social conceptions of science. 
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 In what follows, we use the phrase ‘d-cog’ instead of 
‘distributed cognition’ as a reminder that this is a technical term of art 
rather than just the composition of the usual words ‘distributed’ and 
‘cognition’. There is still a question of how the term of art should be 
understood, of course, and we adopt and argue for a specific criterion 
below. 
1  Framing the Debate 
 Toon does not give a clear characterization of either ‘d-cog’ or 
of the ‘cognitive’ and ‘social’ extremes which it is meant to reconcile. 
Instead, he identifies them just by offering exemplars. Latour and 
Woolgar (1986), for example, stand in for the social extreme. The 
description of navigation teams given by Ed Hutchins (1995) stands in 
for d-cog. Before considering Toon directly, we want to offer a more 
detailed characterization both of d-cog and the tension it is meant to 
resolve. 
1.1  The cognitive and the social 
 Put modestly, Giere’s suggestion is that distributed cognition 
provides “a way of overcoming some of the opposition that many have 
felt between social and cognitive understandings of science” (Giere, 
2006, p. 114). Put more boldly, it is that d-cog can provide “a 
productive theoretical framework that all contributors to science 
studies, including historians, philosophers, psychologists, sociologists 
and anthropologists, can share” (Giere, 2007, p. 319). 
 The cognitive approach is individualist and presumes that the 
primary unit of analysis is the individual organism or thinker. This 
presumption is sometimes just a visceral one; John Searle comments in 
a recent interview, “it upsets me when I read the nonsense written by 
my contemporaries, the theory of extended mind makes me want to 
throw up” (Boag, 2013). It also stems from some common 
methodologies. In philosophy, it can be traced to the tradition which 
treats the task of epistemology as analyzing ‘S knows that P’ for an 
individual knower S and some proposition P. Communities, which 
typically go unmentioned, are made up of atomic individual Ss who 
must each meet the condition for knowledge. In cognitive science, it 
can come from the Good Old-Fashioned AI (GOFAI) approach which 
attempts to model cognition entirely as software which runs inside an 
individual organism, connected to the world by the inputs and outputs 
of biological hardware. 
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 The social approach presumes that the real scientific action 
happens in public. SSK, the sociology of scientific knowledge, is 
typically offered as exemplary of the social approach. Some SSK 
scholars express explicit hostility to epistemology. Latour and Woolgar 
proposed setting it aside entirely and called for a “ten-year moratorium 
on cognitive explanations of science” (1986, p. 280). Giere invokes 
Latour explicity, and Toon calls the proposed moratorium “[p]erhaps 
the clearest instance” of the cognitive/social divide (Toon, 2014, 
p. 112). 
 Latour and Woolgar’s ten-year moratorium ended almost 
twenty years ago, so one might suspect that invocations of it are just 
dying echoes of the 1990s Science Wars. However, although the war is 
over, recent discussions of science sometimes fall along the same battle 
lines. For example, Philip Mirowksi writes in discussing the 
commercialization of science:  
…I want to set out some relatively tractable notions of “good 
science,” starting from some aggregate measures, and then 
ask what has happened to them. Philosophers have turned out 
not very helpful in this regard, primarily acting as though 
there abided generic benchmark characterizations of reliable 
knowledge, meanwhile drawing the bulk of attention away 
from the social conditions and structures that might improve 
or degrade the process of validating or augmenting the 
quality of knowledge. Perhaps even more disturbing, the 
profession of science studies has become absorbed with the 
prospect of “democratizing” science and diminishing the 
power of expertise, to the neglect of considerations of the 
degradation of the knowledge base that might possibly ensue 
as a consequence of “opening up” science to various 
constituencies. (Mirowski, 2011, p. 288)  
Mirowski wants a way of thinking about what it would mean for the 
scientific community to be operating well. He complains that 
philosophers have talked too much about individual knowers, and 
social theorists have nothing to say about cognitive accomplishments of 
science. We might point to writers both in philosophy and science 
studies who have done some of the work that Mirowski wants, but our 
point is simply that he describes the two approaches which Giere 
suggests d-cog can reconcile. 
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1.2  Characterizing d-cog 
 For the sake of concreteness, we will start from a specific 
criterion for d-cog given by Magnus (2007).1 
 It is standard, following David Marr (1982), to distinguish 
levels of analysis. We distinguish the task of an activity from the 
process that implements it. The task is given as “an abstract and 
idealized specification of the behavior to be achieved” (McClamrock , 
1995, p. 20), situated in a context in which the behavior is specfied. 
The process, by contrast, is given by the actual local mechanisms and 
procedures which accomplish the behaviors in that context. Applied to 
one of Marr’s examples (1982, pp. 22–33): Tallying the total cost of 
your purchases is the task accomplished by a cash register. The way 
numbers are representated in the cash register and the physical circuitry 
are both part of the process.2  
 Now we can say that an activity is ‘d-cog’ if (a) the task is one 
that we would consider cognitive if it were performed within a single 
individual and if (b) the process extends beyond the individual. 
(Magnus, 2007, p. 300) This has the virtue of applying clearly to 
exemplars of d-cog and generalizing well to other cases. For example, 
adding sums in your head is a paradigm cognitive activity, so using a 
cash register to tally large sums counts as d-cog. Before moving on, we 
take up several objections that have been raised against this criterion. 
 First, a single system can be characterized in different ways 
relative to different task specifications. Hyundeuk Cheon objects to this 
account that “task-specification relativity is hardly justified” and “task-
specification relativity leads to the relativity of cognition, thus making 
cognition so superficial” (Cheon, 2013). Cheon’s worry only makes 
sense if we think that ‘System S is d-cog’ must be a well-defined 
monadic predicate. We suggest instead that it should be understood 
instead as a relation ‘System S is d-cog for task T’. 
 Second, as we readily acknowledge, there is no single task 
which is performed by cognition simpliciter (Magnus, 2007, p. 307). 
So Cheon objects, “We may therefore ask why [Magnus] demands the 
specification of the task only for distributed cognition, but does not for 
undistributed cognition” (Cheon, 2013). This objection misunderstands 
                                                
1 The criterion given by Magnus (2007), although advocated there 
by just one of us, is posed in terms of a distinction that had earlier 
been articulated by the other of us (McClamrock, 1991; 1995). 
2 Note that this takes both Marr’s algorithm and implementation to 
be aspects of the process. 
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the suggestion. There may be no general way of characterizing a task 
which is performed by all cognition simpliciter, but particular instances 
of cognition — distributed or not — must have particular tasks. For 
example, when a person calculates a sum in her head, the task is to 
perform addition. So cognition simpliciter is also a relation, something 
of the form ‘System S implements the cognitive task T’. Undistributed 
cognition is the special case where the system is entirely within a single 
thinking individual.  
 Note that task-relativity is not an ad hoc peculiarity of d-cog 
explanation. For all kinds of systems, structures often have multiple 
functions with respect to different tasks. To take a non-cognitive 
example, bird feathers contribute both to flight and to temperature 
regulation. Understanding and assessing birds requires recognizing the 
separate tasks that their feathers perform. To take a homey cognitive 
example, imagine someone who is panicking because they are afraid of 
the dark and who attempts to calm themselves by reciting 
multiplication tables. Treating their recitation as a performance of the 
task calculating products misses important aspects of what is going on, 
namely that it is also directed at the task controlling attention and heart 
rate. 
 Third, Cheon suggests that the account conflates notions of 
‘distributed cognition’ and ‘extended cognition’ which have different 
motivations and different consequences. As Cheon has it, “extended 
cognition performs some tasks that one individual, in principle can 
perform” whereas “distributed cognition” pursues “goals that one 
human agent cannot solely achieve” (Cheon, 2013).3 If this is supposed 
to mean that d-cog must have goals which could not even in principle 
be carried out by an individual: We do not know what tasks Cheon has 
in mind, but we worry that they would only count as ‘cognitive’ in 
some contentious sense. A collective accomplishment which is nothing 
like what an individual thinker could achieve is ipso facto not 
something akin to thought. If Cheon means instead to say that d-cog 
                                                
3 Hutchins (2014) uses the phrase “distributed cognition” to mean a 
methodological approach which analyzes cognition in terms of the 
interaction between separate functional elements, even if all of the 
functional components are contained inside a single organism. Our 
characterization of d-cog explicitly requires distribution beyond the 
boundary of an organism, because we are especially interested in 
understanding science. For our purposes, what is crucial is 
precisely the involvement of instruments and communities of 
people. 
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must as a practical matter be something that cannot be done by one 
individual: We readily admit that a great many cognitive tasks are 
impossible for any human to do in their head because of basic limits 
like brain size, but nevertheless we can recognize the tasks as ones that 
are cognitive. For example, there is a limit to the size of arithmetic 
calculations that a given material brain can perform, but performing 
larger calculations still counts as a cognitive task. If my task is adding a 
long series of numbers, the pad of paper or calculator I use is a critical 
part of my task solution, such that I could not do the task in the same 
way (and maybe not even at all) without such a tool. If Cheon allows 
that a large enough paper-and-pencil calculation counts as distributed 
cognition, then it seems natural to also count a smaller calculation 
which I could perhaps have done in my head when I actually opt to 
carry it out longhand.4 
 Fourth, one might worry d-cog entails the existence of extended 
minds in a metaphysically thick sense of mind. In Clark’s way of 
putting it, extended cognition is the view that “the actual local 
operations that realize certain forms of human cognizing include 
inextricable tangles… of brain, body, and world. The local mechanisms 
of mind, if this is correct, are not all in the head” (Clark, 2008, p. 
xxviii). This can be taken to mean that parts of the world outside the 
organism not only contribute to the content of cognition but also bear 
mental properties. There has been prominent and healthy debate over 
this thesis. (Clark, 2008; Adams & Aizawa, 2008) For our current 
purposes, however, we need not take a stance in that debate. Much 
ballyhooed questions about mind are not our target. For something to 
be d-cog, it suffices that the mechanisms underlying someone’s ability 
to accomplish cognitive tasks are in part outside that person’s body. 
Extended mind, read in a strong way, is the additional claim that at 
                                                
4 One might wonder about the relation between d-cog and embedded 
cognition — the view that, as Rupert puts it, “cognitive processes 
depend heavily, and in hitherto unexpected ways, on 
organismically external properties and devices, and on the structure 
of the external environment in which the cognition takes place” 
(2004, p. 393). The central claim of both is that mechanisms, 
objects, and structures instantiated outside the body are often 
critical supporting networks to the task accomplished in cognition. 
If one reads embedded cognition as something that happens inside 
the organism but requires the external structure as props, then it is a 
somewhat more conservative view. Alternately, one might read 
embedded cognition as d-cog. 
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least some of those mechanisms are also constitutive of the person 
having a mind or at least a mind of a certain sort. 
 Fifth, some authors think it is important to distinguish 
distributed cognition which distributes the process across props and 
tools from distributed cognition which distributes the process across 
several individuals. If one begins by wondering about the boundaries of 
one’s own mind, one might be interested in the way that instruments 
extend one’s abilities but not in the way other people do. The other 
people, after all, have their own minds. So one could characterize 
distribution in a way which only allows there to be one thinker at the 
center of it. Contrariwise, Giere allows distributed cognition to involve 
more than one person. Yet he requires it to involve tools and 
instruments, counting cognition which includes multiple people but no 
tools as mere ‘collective cognition’ (Giere, 2007). We do not make 
either restriction, but rather intend d-cog as the broader and more 
inclusive category including both variants. Although tools may be 
crucial to some d-cog explanations, others are predominantly social. In 
order to understand how science as a social endeavor can do cognitive 
work, it is precisely the involvement of so many people — where none 
of them has the whole scheme in their own mind — that is crucial. So 
we neither require instruments nor preclude other people being 
involved in d-cog. We insist that the process which implements d-cog 
will include something outside the individual organism, but those 
outside contributors might be other people, things, or both. Just as we 
are agnostic on the question of whether a d-cog system of individual 
with a smartphone has an extended mind, we are agnostic as to whether 
a scientific team has some kind of hive mind. 
 Sixth, and finally, some authors have argued that a definition of 
d-cog should be broader than this criterion. For example, Matthew 
Brown (2011) suggests moving beyond the task/process distinction to a 
tri-fold distinction between operations, actions, and activities. So a 
system S might be d-cog qua activity system, without specifying any 
further terms. He concludes provocatively, “presumably, I am some 
kind of cognitive system, even though I am not built to carry out one 
specific and well-bounded task, even though my cognitive activities 
evolve, and aren’t always as well-bounded as certain cognitive theories 
might presuppose” (Brown, 2011, p. 28). Note, however, that Brown’s 
alternative has not been developed in any detail. We worry about 
whether it can be applied in a clear way to substantive cases.5 
                                                
5 We have the same worry about Cheon’s (2013) positive definition, 
which includes many unexplicated jargon terms: “cognitive 
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Regardless, the objection is only that the conception is too narrow — 
not that it is too lax. The worry misses its mark, since the condition is 
not a definition but only a sufficient condition (Magnus, 2007, p. 300). 
A sufficient condition, even if it does not exhaust the phenomena, is 
enough to positively diagnose cases of d-cog. If some more expansive 
definition could be elaborated and fruitfully employed, it would 
encompass both the cases we discuss below and more besides. 
 Having cleared this ground, let’s turn to Toon’s objections. 
2  Toon’s challenge 
 Adam Toon (2014) raises three kinds of problems for d-cog. 
Here are the three problems, briefly. We consider each at greater length 
in subsequent sections. 
1. A d-cog description may explain how a task is performed but not 
why it is performed.  
2. A d-cog description is only contingently social, whereas many social 
theorists insist that science is essentially social.  
3. A d-cog description is cognitive only in a technical sense of 
‘cognitive’, not in the pretheoretic sense that frames the opposition 
between the social and the cognitive.  
2.1  Why the task is performed 
 Toon points out that a d-cog description of some cognitive 
activity does not explain why the activity was performed. Hutchins’ 
analysis of navigation describes the activities of a ship’s crew and can 
explain why particular elements of the navigation cycle happen as they 
do (for example, why the plotter draws a particular line on a map). Yet 
it cannot explain why the whole cycle occurs at all or even, in Toon’s 
view, help to account for such matters. 
 We argue that Toon’s reasons for this depend on misconstruing 
the three-level analysis that he inherits from Marr and Hutchins. As 
originally posed by Marr, the analysis separates the computational 
theory (concerned with “the goal of the computation, why is it 
appropriate, and what is the logic of the strategy by which it can be 
                                                                                                                
outputs” which result from “coordinated information processing” 
and the propagation of “semantic information”. Although the 
phrases use familiar English words, we do not have a precise 
enough understanding of them to apply the definition to cases. 
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carried out”), the account of representation and algorithm (which asks 
“How can this computational theory be implemented?  In particular, 
what is the representation for the input and output, and what is the 
algorithm for the transformation?”), and hardware implementation 
(concerned with “How can the representation and algorithm be realized 
physically?”) (Marr, 1982, p. 25).6 
 Toon applies this distinction in a way that inappropriately 
seems to undermine d-cog. In his characterization, “d-cog is a claim 
about what happens at the implementation level of a computation”, by 
describing how its physical implementation might be distributed in the 
physical world, and “it is in this sense that d-cog offers a means of 
integrating cognitive and social factors”. Because he takes d-cog 
analysis to just be about hardware implementation, Toon thinks it “will 
not tell us why a particular computation is being performed or why a 
specific representational system is being used to carry it out” and that 
“d-cog analysis… will not tell us how a representational system gains 
its representational status.” So he claims that d-cog “cannot help to 
reconcile debate between” social and cognitive answers to such 
questions (Toon, 2014, p.117). 
 However, showing how activities are d-cog is a matter of 
showing facts about not only implementation but about representation 
and algorithm as well. The analysis of the division of labor in 
navigation is not only about what physical things play various roles, 
but is even more centrally about how the process that accomplishes the 
task is divided into a set of cooperating sub-procedures and exchanges 
of information — that is, the representations and algorithms for 
accomplishing the task of navigation. Such analyses of information 
processing within the system, rather than exclusively hardware 
implementation descriptions, are just the sort of things that in turn 
inform and illuminate the content-level questions that should be 
addressed at the level of task. (McClamrock, 1995) Contra Toon, much 
of a d-cog analysis will “concern the choice of representational scheme 
used to carry out a computation” rather than merely “the way that the 
computation is implemented”; cf. (Toon, 2014, p.117). So the broader 
questions may well be at least partially answered within the d-cog 
framework. 
                                                
6 Ultimately, the three ‘level’ analysis must be adjusted to account 
for different perspectives on various levels of organization of 
complex systems; see McClamrock (1991). As David Danks put it, 
Marr’s three levels conflate “a multidimensional space of 
theoretical commitments” (2013, p. 2129). 
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 Of course there are limitations, but d-cog explanations are no 
different than traditional cognitive explanations in this regard. Consider 
David Danks’ criticism of rational analyses which explain an agent’s 
input or output in terms of its solving a particular task in a specified 
environment (2008). Such analyses do not ultimately explain the 
agents’ input and output, Danks notes, because they do not explain how 
the agent developed so as to employ the optimal strategy. Showing how 
the task is functional does not show how it came to be undertaken. This 
is only a problem for the d-cog approach if broader context would 
involve incompatible descriptions in social or in cognitive terms, so 
that the tension between the two returns. A broader analysis will 
necessarily be something further, but it may also be d-cog. The 
navigation cycle determines the position of the ship, and position 
information is used in various ways in the broader operation of the 
ship. Using different task analyses of the activity makes it possible to 
situate it in these broader contexts. The navigation cycle occurs to 
determine the present position of the ship, which is used to plot the 
movement of the ship over time for purposes of navigation and 
planning. Those tasks figure in the life of the ship, which is a unit in the 
navy, which in turn is a strategic instrument of the nation. The regress 
of explanation must come to a stop somewhere, because we only 
follow it as far as our explanatory interests require and our abilities 
allow, but that alone will not drive a wedge between the cognitive 
against the social. If we persist in asking why questions about each 
broader element, we will eventually reach a point where d-cog 
explanations break down — but we will also reach a point where 
neither social nor cognitive explanations are available. 
2.2  Whether science is essentially social 
 Toon points out that a d-cog description makes social processes 
logically contingent. For scholars who prefer social explanations, Toon 
suggests, science being social is essential and logically necessary. So a 
d-cog description would not satisfy them. 
 Stated in this way, it is not much of an objection. Admittedly, d-
cog alone does not and should not absolutely necessitate social 
distribution of the tasks among multiple agents. Yet the centrality of 
social distribution to the activity and task of gaining scientific 
knowledge is what we should expect, given our cognitive limits and 
social natures — facts about us which are in principle contingent, but 
deeply general and entrenched. Because of the kinds of creatures we 
are, we cannot really do science without working together. So science’s 
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being a social enterprise is practically indispensable for us. The mere 
logical possibility of an epistemic angel who does science alone in its 
own mind is too abstruse to matter for understanding science as a thing 
that finite creatures do. Science as socially distributed cognition is a 
variety of d-cog, not something in conflict with it. 
 Toon presses the point by observing that d-cog explanation does 
not explain how d-cog systems have representational content (that is, 
how they come to have meaning). The d-cog explanation can describe 
the operation of social and material representations, but it “leaves open 
the question of how those representations come to represent the world.” 
He adds that “this is a question that receives very different answers 
from social and cognitive accounts of science. For example, members 
of the Edinburgh Strong Programme in the sociology of science 
propose a theory of meaning known as finitism, drawn from the later 
Wittgenstein” (Toon, 2014, p. 118). 
 In reply, it is important to consider why the social nature of 
science is important to thinkers like those in the Edinburgh school. On 
closer inspection, their reasons to insist that science is social are not 
reasons to quarrel with d-cog. David Bloor, one of the architects of the 
Edinburgh school and the strong program, explicitly rejects the division 
between the cognitive and the social. The division reflects what Bloor 
calls “the ‘distortion’ model”, i.e. “the traditional rationalist dichotomy 
between the rational and the social” (1991, p. 169). The distortion 
model only allows for a weak sociology of knowledge, because social 
factors would only be factors distorting rather than contributing to 
knowledge. Such a weak program is just what the strong program is 
defined against.7 
 Still, Toon is right that the strong program takes the social 
nature of science to be essential. Bloor writes that “our best and most 
cherished scientific achievements could not exist as they do without 
having the character of social institutions” (1991, p. 164). Bloor argues 
for this by imagining several separate people who look at the same 
measurements and infer “their own personal version of Boyle’s Law.” 
The solipsist-scientists would not yet have “Boyle’s Law as we know 
it”, however, because they would not have “a scientific community 
with a shared body of knowledge” (Bloor, 1991, p. 168). The 
community having a publicly available theory as a shared object is 
different than each individual having private representations which just 
happen to coincide. However, this strikes us as entirely compatible 
                                                
7 Bloor himself expresses the opposition in these term, e.g. (Bloor, 
1991, p. 165). 
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with d-cog explanations. There would be some commonality between 
the two cases (insofar as the imagined personal versions of Boyle’s 
Law and actual public versions of Boyle’s Law can both count as 
versions of Boyle’s Law in some sense) but there is the deeply 
important difference between them (insofar as one is the imagined feat 
of an almost inhuman private cognition and the other is the actual 
product of human d-cog). 
 Finally, some of the apparent disagreement is just 
terminological, because parties define ‘knowledge’ in different ways. 
The Edinburgh school defines ‘knowledge’, as distinct from individual 
belief, in collective terms. Bloor writes: “Of course knowledge must be 
distinguished from mere belief. This can be done by reserving the word 
‘knowledge’ for what is collectively endorsed” (1991, p. 5). Steven 
Shapin writes similarly that “the very idea of knowledge implicates a 
public and shared commodity, to be contrasted with the individual’s 
state of belief” (1996, p. 106). If knowledge must be social simply as a 
matter of definition, then so too for scientific knowledge qua 
knowledge.8 Epistemologists who define ‘knowledge’ differently are 
disagreeing about how to use words rather than about substance.9 It 
seems to us that d-cog is independent of these matters. It is compatible 
with both collectivist and individualist definitions of ‘knowledge’, and 
so with the collective nature of ‘scientific knowledge’ being necessary 
                                                
8 In addition to SSK, Toon mentions the work of Helen Longino. He 
writes, “Similar claims are also found in the work of authors 
outside SSK. For example, Longino writes that science is 
‘necessarily social’ ” (2014, p. 120). In the passage he cites, 
Longino argues that “the development of knowledge is a 
necessarily social rather than individual activity” (Longino, 1990, 
p. 12). Here the terminological difference seems especially acute. 
Longino offers several definitions of ‘knowledge’, all of which 
include the community as an explicit term (Longino, 2002, 
pp. 135–140). 
9 Note that the issue can be made substantive by combining an 
individualist definition of knowledge with the requirement that 
cognitive activity yield knowledge. For example, Giere (2013) 
insists that science must yield human knowledge for an individual. 
Krist Vaesen (2011) argues that this risks allowing any d-cog 
analysis to be refigured in individual terms. Although our 
sympathies lie with Vaesen, d-cog as we understand it is 
compatible with either Giere or Vaesen being right. 
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by definition or merely necessary given deep facts about the kinds of 
creatures we are. 
2.3  What sense of ‘cognitive’ is in play 
 Toon objects that d-cog is only ‘cognitive’ in a technical sense. 
It does not mean, for example, the thinkings of a mind. Indeed, its 
status as a term of art was our motivation for adopting the abbreviation 
‘d-cog’ in the first place. Yet, Toon suggests, scholars who prefer 
cognitive explanations do so for some ordinary sense of ‘cognitive’. So 
there is a possible gap between the cognitive explanations they want 
and the explanations d-cog provides. 
 There are several possible answers to the criticism. 
 First, the gap could be closed by adopting a much extended 
conception of mind, so that all cognition would be permeated by 
external and social mechanisms. The revolutionary conception of mind 
would comfortably take in d-cog. As we explained above, however, we 
adopt an anodyne conception of d-cog and remain agnostic with respect 
to deeper issues in the metaphysics of cognition and mind.  
 Second, a parallel problem arises for any technical jargon. We 
can ask, for example, whether the epistemologist ends up saying 
anything which applies to ‘knowledge’ in an ordinary sense. The mere 
possibility of a mismatch is a general feature of philosophical 
explication. So what?  
 Third, for any d-cog which meets the criterion we defended in 
section 1.2, there is a more direct answer. The criterion for d-cog is 
silent as to whether or not an operation of a community is cognitive 
simpliciter, but the task must be one which would count as ‘cognitive’ 
in the ordinary sense if it were carrying out just in an individual 
thinker. So, although the d-cog system might not strictly-speaking be 
cognitive — depending on your view on extended as opposed to merely 
embedded mind — the characterization has a built-in connection to the 
ordinary conception of cognition. 
 It remains to be shown that d-cog which meets this criterion 
will do the work of reconciling the cognitive and the social. In the next 
section, we illustrate one way that it can by looking at recent research 
on the division of cognitive labor.10 
                                                
10 Other examples given by Magnus (2007) include the machinery in 
a carpentry shop and double-blind clinical trials. 
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3  D-cog at work 
 Consider scientists working together to discover what the world 
is like. 
 If we focus only on individual cognition, scientists’ tasks are 
specific ones about experimental design, data collection, analysis — 
and even more quotidian things like filling out paperwork. Putting all 
that into soft focus, writers in the epistemology literature tend to 
privilege a broader individual task: Evaluate the theoretical possibilities 
so as to believe the theory most likely to be true. 
 If we retain the broad perspective but focus on the community, 
then the collective task might be something like: Explore the space of 
possibilities so that all are sufficiently interrogated. This may not be 
something that is done well by each scientist pursuing their own 
personal, epistemic good. One individual only has limited resources; 
she sets up a lab with some particular equipment, she only has finite 
time and attention, etc. So different individuals might believe in 
different theories and approaches, pursuing them independently. 
Exploring new possibilities needs to be balanced against further 
articulating established approaches. This would be difficult for a single 
scientist to do simply in her own work, but it can be solved at the 
community level by having a mixed community of more conservative 
and more adventurous scientists. Most scientists should work within 
the dominant approach, both because it has a proven track record of 
problem-solving and because its success relies on their cooperating to 
advance it. Yet some scientists should pursue novel approaches, even 
though most of those will be dead ends. This point was seen clearly by 
Thomas Kuhn. In the 1969 postscript to The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions, he writes that  
 individual variability in the application of shared values may 
serve functions essential to science. The points at which 
values must be applied are invariably also those at which 
risks must be taken. Most anomalies are resolved by normal 
means; most proposals for new theories do prove to be 
wrong. If all members of a community responded to each 
anomaly as a source of crisis or embraced each new theory 
advanced by a colleague, science would cease. If, on the 
other hand, no one reacted to anomalies or to brand-new 
theories in high-risk ways, there would be few or no 
revolutions. (Kuhn, 2012, pp. 185–6) 
So this explanation was available to all of the parties to the Science 
Wars, even if its implications were not recognized. Kuhn himself 
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simply employs the idea to motivate thinking of scientific desiderata as 
values rather than rules. 
 Since Kuhn, this has come to be called the division of cognitive 
labor. Michael Weisberg (2010) and Ryan Muldoon (2013) distinguish 
three approaches in the recent literature. 
 First: the marginal contribution/reward approach exemplified 
by the work of Philip Kitcher (1990; 1993, ch. 8). Scientists are 
modeled as self-interested agents after the fashion of models in 
classical economics. Without any central planning, a reward structure 
which pays scientists for making discoveries can cause them to divide 
between mining the established approach and exploring novel 
approaches. The established approach is more likely to pay off, but 
with so many scientists on the job it is less likely to payoff for any 
particular individual than a speculative approach.  
 Second: the epistemic network approach exemplified by the 
work of Kevin Zollman (2010). Scientists are modeled as only having 
partial information about what other scientists are doing, and they 
pursue various approaches because of what seems appropriate given 
their limited information. It is possible for this community arrangement 
to achieve better outcomes than if each scientist was always fully 
informed. Zollman concludes, “Looking at these scientists from the 
perspective of individualistic epistemology, one might be inclined to 
criticize the scientists’ behavior. However, when viewed as a 
community, their behavior becomes optimal” (2010, p. 33). 
 Third: the epistemic landscape approach exemplified by work 
of Weisberg and Muldoon (2009). It models the space of possible 
approaches as a landscape and scientists as either mavericks (who 
eagerly push out to new regions of the landscape) or followers (who go 
where others have had the most success). This is a formal version of 
Kuhn’s idea that some scientists will explore new possibilities 
aggressively while others will stick to the established way of doing 
things. 
 All of these approaches are recognizably socially-distributed 
varieties of d-cog. An individual might divide their time and attention 
between exploring different approaches, but it is impractical for this to 
actually be done within an individual. A scientist spends time 
developing the skills suited to one approach or another, and their 
enthusiasm and effectiveness may depend on not dividing their 
attention. There are also material as well as psychological constraints. 
A scientist equips their lab for particular approaches and cannot mount 
parallel labs in which they would pursue other approaches. So the 
problem of dividing attention becomes a social problem of dividing 
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labor. The cognitive task is implemented not in the work of a single 
universal scientist but across a community of scientists. 
 The example also underscores the task-relativity of d-cog. 
Above, we characterized the task as exploring the space of possible 
theories. That is something that an individual might try to do, although 
it is better done by a community. Once it is approached as a collective 
enterprise, one might consider the task to be determine the optimal 
distribution of labor. Too, this might be attempted by a single 
individual — a central planner assigning scientists to various tasks. The 
upshot of the literature on the distribution of cognitive labor is that it is 
better to configure the community so that individuals arrive at 
something near an optimal distribution without such central planning. 
 Finally, one might characterize the task as something like 
distribute the cognitive labor. That is obviously not something that a 
single individual could do. A partitioned mind which could function as 
a community of individuals would just be a community, rather than an 
individual. Yet the former two task specifications do describe 
important aspects of science, and the process which implements those 
tasks makes it d-cog. 
4  Conclusion 
 By giving examples of substantive and rewarding analyses of 
the scientific community as solving what are recognizably cognitive 
problems with solutions which meet the criterion for d-cog, we have 
deflected the last of Toon’s worries. Contra Toon, d-cog does not sneak 
by with some ersatz sense of ‘cognition’. 
 At the outset, we noted that the promise of d-cog can be 
understood in a more modest or in a more bold way. 
 The modest promise was that d-cog would provide “a way of 
overcoming some of the opposition that many have felt between social 
and cognitive understandings of science” (Giere, 2006, p. 114). A 
worked example, like the literature on the division of scientific labor, is 
sufficient to fulfill that promise. It shows how social organization can 
be understood as doing epistemic work. 
 The bold promise was that d-cog would provide “a productive 
theoretical framework” (Giere, 2007, p. 319). This is a harder promise 
to discharge, because it is forward looking. Whether a present research 
program will be productive and rewarding is something to be judged in 
retrospect, by future scholars. It is a programmatic commitment, 
namely that d-cog looks promising. For this, there is little value in 
characterizing d-cog in a metaphysical way which stymies application 
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to cases. A readily applicable conception of d-cog — like the one we 
have defended — is most useful. 
Acknowledgements 
We would like to thank Adam Toon and several anonymous referees 
for their helpful comments on earlier drafts. 
References 
Adams, F.R., & Aizawa, K. (2008). The Bounds of Cognition. Malden, 
Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishing. 
Bloor, D. (1991). Knowledge and Social Imagery. Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press. Second edition. 
Boag, Z. (2013) Searle: it upsets me when I read the nonsense written 
by my contemporaries. New Philosopher, 1(2), November 2 
2013. Posted on-line 25jan2014. URL: 
http://www.newphilosopher.com/articles/joh
n-searle 
Brown, M. (2011). Science as socially distributed cognition: Bridging 
philosophy and sociology of science. In K. François, B. Löwe, 
T. Müller, & B. van Kerkhove (Ed.), Foundations of the Formal 
Sciences VII, volume 32 of Studies in Logic (pp. 17–30). 
College Publications. 
Cheon, H. (2013). Distributed cognition in scientific contexts. Journal 
for General Philosophy of Science. Published on-line. 
doi:10.1007/s10838-013-9226-4 
Clark, A. (2008). Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and 
Cognitive Extension. Oxford University Press. 
Danks, D. (2008). Rational analyses, instrumentalism, and 
implementations. In N. Chater & M. Oaksford (Eds.), The 
Probabilistic Mind: Prospects for Bayesian Cognitive Science  
(pp. 59–78). Oxford University Press. URL: 
http://repository.cmu.edu/philosophy/89 
Danks, D. (2013). Moving from levels & reduction to dimensions & 
constraints. In M. Knauff, M. Pauen, N. Sebanz, & I. 
Wachsmuth (Eds.), Proceedings of the 35th Annual Meeting of 
the Cognitive Science Society (pp. 2124–2129), Austin, Texas, 
August 2013. 
Giere, R.N. (2002a). Discussion note: Distributed cognition and 
epistemic cultures. Philosophy of Science, 69(4), 637–644. 
 Friends with Benefits! 18 
Giere, R.[N.] (2002b) Scientific cognition as distributed cognition. In 
P. Carruthers, S. Stitch, & M. Siegal (Eds.), The Cognitive 
Basis of Science (pp. 285–299). Cambridge University Press. 
Giere, R.N. (2003a). Computation and agency in scientific cognition. 
In Proceedings of the 25th Annual Conference of the Cognitive 
Science Society, 2003, Boston, Massachusetts, July 31– August 
2. 
Giere, R.N. (2003b). A new program for philosophy of science. 
Philosophy of Science, 90(1), 15–21. 
Giere, R.N. (2003c). The role of computation in scientific cognition. 
Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence, 
15(2), 195–202. 
Giere, R.N. (2006). Scientific perspectivism. Chicago, Illinois. 
University of Chicago Press. 
Giere, R.N. (2007). Distributed cognition without distributed knowing. 
Social Epistemology, 21(3), 313–320. 
Giere, R.N. (2013). Scientific cognition: human centered but not 
human bound. Philosophical Explorations, 15(2), 199–206. 
Giere, R.N., & Moffatt, B. (2003). Distributed cognition: Where the 
cognitive and the social merge. Social Studies of Science, 33(2), 
1–10, April 2003. 
Hutchins, E. (1995). Cognition in the Wild. The MIT Press, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, 1995. 
Hutchins, E. (2014). The cultural ecosystem of human cognition. 
Philosophical Psychology, 27(1), 34–49, January 2014. 
Kitcher, P. (1990). The division of cognitive labor. Philosophy of 
Science, 87(1), 5–22. 
Kitcher, P. (1993). The Advancement of Science. Oxford University 
Press. 
Kuhn, T.S. (2012). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago, 
Illinois: University of Chicago Press. Fourth edition. 
Longino, H. (1990). Science as Social Knowledge. Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
Longino, H. (2002) The Fate of Knowledge. Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press. 
Latour, B, & Woolgar, S. (1986). Laboratory Life: The Construction of 
Scientific Facts. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press. 
Magnus, P.D. (2007). Distributed cognition and the task of science. 
Social Studies of Science, 37(2), 297–310. 
Marr, D. (1982). Vision. San Francisco: W.H. Freeman and Company. 
 Friends with Benefits! 19 
McClamrock, R. (1991). Marr’s three levels: A re-evaluation. Minds 
and Machines, 1(2), 185–196. 
McClamrock, R. (1995). Existential Cognition: Computational Minds 
in the World. Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press. 
Mirowski, P. (2011). Science-mart: Privating American science. 
Camrbidge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 
Muldoon, R. (2013). Diversity and the division of cognitive labor. 
Philosophy Compass, 8(2), 117–125. 
Rupert, R.D. (2004). Challenges to the hypothesis of extended 
cognition. Journal of Philosophy, 101(8), 389–428. 
Shapin, S. (1996). The Scientific Revolution. Chicago, Illinois: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Toon, A. (2014). Friends at last?  Distributed cognition and the 
cognitive/social divide. Philosophical Psychology, 27(1), 112–
125. 
Vaesen. K. (2011). Giere’s (in)appropriation of distributed cognition. 
Social Epistemology, 25(4), 379–391. 
Weisberg, M. (2010). New approaches to the division of cognitive 
labor. In P.D. Magnus & J. Busch, editors, New Waves in 
Philosophy of Science (pp. 250–269). Basingstoke, Hampshire: 
Palgrave MacMillan. 
Weisberg, M., & Muldoon, R. (2009). Epistemic landscapes and the 
division of cognitive labor. Philosophy of Science, 76(2), 225–
252. 
Zollman, K.J.S. (2010). The epistemic benefit of transient diversity. 
Erkenntnis, 72(1), 17–35. 
